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Abstract  
Purpose – Investigation of the importance of political connections in the emerging market context.  
Design/methodology/approach – Case study analysis of three Russian pharmaceutical firms is 
analyzed to uncover how they performed through the Russian transition–the institutional upheaval of 
the 1990s and the ongoing state-led industrialization. 
Findings – In the early years of transition, firms heavily rely on political networking to gain 
legitimacy and fill institutional voids. As institutions strengthen, the need for political networking is 
being substituted by arms-length networking. Strengthening of institutions also results in a more 
stable business environment, evolving firms’ strategies from short-term core competency 
concentration to long-term innovative visions.  
Research implications – Firms operating in the Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and some other Eastern European state domains must be wary of complex ties that are prevalent in 
these countries and often can assist or hinder firm performance. Although formal institutions 
strengthen arms-length networks, close cooperation between strategic firms and the state remains.  
Originality/value – The paper proposes two phases of the Russian transition and provides a 
taxonomy of strategic choices of Russian firms during the transition. Further, the paper describes the 
key institutional developments in the two phases of the Russian transition. Finally, a framework of 
political connections and their role in business operations in the two phases of the transition is 
provided.  






There is growing interest in the literature on the impact of changing institutional contexts in transition 
economies, and the strategic choices made by businesses to cope with sudden and rapid liberalization. 
Limited research identifies the bilateral and inter-dependent relationship that politics and businesses 
often share (Boddewyn, 2016; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and how prospective firms entering emerging 
economies need to be cognizant of these relationships (Peng and Luo, 2000). What has received less 
attention in the literature is how political networking (Kotabe et al., 2017) becomes an essential part 
of the strategy toolbox employed by firms to deal with uncertainties of rapidly changing institutional 
contexts.  
Some studies have touched upon the issue of how former state-owned enterprises (Peng and 
Heath, 1996) or enormous oligarchic companies (Braguinsky and Myerson, 2007) forge ties with the 
government but have not devoted sufficient attention to the discourse on the implications of how firms 
from developing countries leverage government relations in uncertain institutional environments. A 
recent paper by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, based on Forbes’ 1996-2015 
Richest List, finds 64 percent of self-made billionaires in Russia owe their riches to political 
connections, compared to only 3.8 in US, 9.2 in China, and 20.4 in Europe, and 10 percent globally, 
on average. In Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and some Eastern European countries, the 
situation is even more dire, where 100 percent in Kazakhstan, Romania, Georgia and 55.6 percent of 
billionaires in Ukraine are politically connected (Freund and Oliver, 2016).  
Two research questions are posed: i) Are political connections a prerequisite for building 
business to fill institutional voids in Russia; and ii) Does strengthening of institutions influence 
strategic choices of Russian pharmaceutical firms insofar as the extent their networking with the 
government? To achieve this objective, strategic choices of firms within the rapidly changing 
institutional environment of the last quarter of a century are documented.  
The paper begins with a review of studies on political networking and its implications, an 
exercise that also uncovers the gap in the literature and lack of comprehensive empirical research on 
transition economies, especially on Russia and CIS. Building on these insights, this paper explores 
how political networking affects distinct competitive strategies of firms within the two phases of 
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transition in Russia. Based on the analysis, a framework that demonstrates how firms adapt utilizing 
political networking within transitioning institutional environment is drawn. 
FIRMS’ STRATEGIC CHOICES – POLITICAL NETWORK-BASED GROWTH 
Institutions are a critical resource as a factor of production and also prescient in their role of 
bestowing institutional legitimacy to actors within an economic framework (Hillman and Wan, 2005). 
The creation of new ventures without formal institutions, such as functioning laws and regulatory 
frameworks, and informal institutions, such as shared industry norms and common business practices, 
involves high levels of risk and complexity (Peng, 2001). This can be a trigger for spawning 
interdependent informal institutional relationships between those with legitimate authority and power 
and those who are resource dependent on the former.  
Theoretical contributions to the field of political connections portray interesting elements. 
Boddewyn & Brewer (1994) report political connections formed an integral factor of competitiveness 
within the resource-based view. The connections provide intelligence, access, bargaining power, 
money, and influence. Hillman & Hitt (1999) developed a taxonomy of political strategies that shape 
the business environment and competitiveness of the players and found a positive relationship 
between personal political ties and firm performance in a wide range of US firms (Hillman et al., 
1999). Some studies have shown corporations seek harmonious co-operation with governments that 
provides favorable conditions for innovative ventures (Sigurdson, 2000). When considering first 
mover advantages, political resources create significant entry barriers and competitive advantages, 
especially in key strategic industries, despite globalization and liberalization trends (Frynas et al., 
2006). What is also instructive is that late movers with stronger political ties can challenge privileged 
positions of pioneers (Frynas et al., 2006). In transition economies, political networking and 
functional experience is beneficial to new ventures (Li and Zhang, 2007).  
Organizations seek to establish congruence between their values implied in their actions and the 
acceptable and desired behavior within the wider institutional environment. This congruence is 
referred to as organizational legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Suchman (1995) identified three 
principal forms of organizational legitimacy – pragmatic, moral and cognitive. This study mainly 
relies on self-interest of organizations in gaining competitive advantages and recognition i.e. 
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pragmatic legitimacy. Political connections may enhance the legitimacy and competitive advantages 
of organizations (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Pfeffer, 1973). Further references to legitimate 
behavior are provided throughout the paper specifically in the context of emerging market firms 
(EMFs).  
Studies on EMFs dwell primarily on how institutional voids govern firms to adopt a network-
based strategic approach. This perspective is popular in analyzing development of firms on transition 
economies in the absence of formal institutions that facilitate firm growth, shared access to tangible 
and intangible assets, just to name a few (Danis et al., 2009; Michailova and Worm, 2003; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2007; Wright et al., 2005). More recently, Boddewyn (2016) summarized 70 years of IB 
and government relations literature in arguing there is little known about IBGR, and the output has 
been declining in the past two decades. Yet, the literature on institutional voids falls short of devoting 
sufficient attention to the importance of government relations in the dynamics of the firm in the ex-
Soviet Union context. As well literature on strategic choices of Russian firms is limited. There is a 
consensus in the literature in the need for more empirical papers investigating these relations. This 
paper intends to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive case-study analysis of the key strategic 
industry in Russia on political connections and firm strategies. This paper, therefore, is a valuable 
contribution on understanding how strengthening and leveraging existing ties with regulatory 
authorities can avoid bureaucratic hurdles and gain legitimacy (Filatotchev et al., 2000; Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999).  
Political connections are not always shown as a panacea for competitiveness in all studies. 
Kotabe et al. (2017) observe that political ties may create complacency and inefficiency in firms 
reliant on protectionist measures. Political participation may require firms to meet social and political 
objectives, rather than their own (La Porta et al., 1999). The over-embeddedness may influence the 
way a company operates, restricting innovativeness and potential (Luo, 2000). Firms tunnel resources 
into political relationships, and those connected tend to be more likely to win political favors, e.g., 
public procurement. More corrupt localities tend to support less productive firms in Russia (Mironov 
& Zhuravskaya, 2016). 
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While political networking substitutes formal regulatory structures and enhances efficiency 
(Peng and Luo, 2000), those firms that face the drawback of newness and disconnectedness, as well as 
those that are ‘outsiders’, encounter significant difficulties in competing with connected firms and 
gaining legitimacy (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Luo, 1997). The seemingly advantageous effects of 
political networking expand onto gaining insider information, access to resources that are otherwise 
unavailable and increasing opportunity recognition (Gu et al., 2008). In China, political guanxi 
influences the legitimacy of a business within the system and influences the growth strategy of 
businesses by creating loosely-structured networks (guanxihu) to facilitate economic exchanges and 
avoid bureaucratic hurdles (Luo and Chen, 1996). In the Russian context, blat is often compared to 
Chinese guanxi. Blat goes back to Soviet years when money and goods were in short supply and 
parties ‘helped out’. It served as alternative currency – an informal exchange of favors (Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011) that substituted markets. Due to the generic nature of the phenomenon, blat 
constituted relations between businesses, people, and politicians. Blat has evolved since the transition 
and is different to guanxi in its more arms-length approach using material goods, mostly money, and 
can mean one-off transactions between parties (Michailova and Worm, 2003).  
Low levels of institutionalisation in a particular environment pose severe challenges for firms 
(Peng, 2001; Tracey and Phillips, 2011). While describing transition economies, Peng (2003: 285) 
argued ‘‘... they have to rapidly build ties to establish legitimacy, thus necessitating an intense 
networking strategy.’’ Not surprisingly in a highly paternalistic environment, multinationals in 
strategic industries are observed to gain competitive advantages by overcoming various forms of entry 
barriers and gaining first mover advantages if home and host governments provide support – as in 
Lockheed Martin entering Russia (Frynas et al., 2006). Therefore, in countries with regulatory 
uncertainty and emergent institutions, engaging directly with decision-makers may create policy 
changes and catalyze success of multinationals (Choudhury et al., 2012). Overall, through the 
enhanced system of reciprocity and monitoring of incentives, governments are able to drive economic 
growth through collaboration and protection of key industries (Amsden, 1997).  
During the process of transition, when formal institutions such as regulatory frameworks are 
developing, connections on all levels of government are necessary to gain critical resources such as 
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land, approvals and other bureaucratic levers (Ahlstrom et al., 2000; Xin and Pearce, 1996). 
Entrepreneurial start-ups link with other firms and the government (Peng and Luo, 2000; Xin and 
Pearce, 1996). These firms utilize prospecting to prove their legitimacy within the environment by 
doing more with less (Peng, 2001). As transition continues, incumbent firms resist the market-based 
competition and strengthen their connections (Greenwood and Hinings, 2010). Restructuring and 
developing new market-based capabilities may also form a part of the strategy of these firms (Wright 
et al., 2005). New firms must maintain at least minimal networks and contacts and build extensive 
market-based capabilities (Peng, 2003).  
Connections with politicians facilitate approvals and avoid bureaucratic hurdles (Luo and Chen, 
1996; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). Sometimes, when institutions are emerging, political networking 
supplements formal regulatory structures and enhances business efficiency (Peng and Luo, 2000). 
However, when institutional contexts are chaotic, political connections are the only means to do 
business. Under such circumstances, many firms without connections face the drawback of newness 
and disconnectedness. Outsiders have significant difficulties competing with connected firms 
(Hillman and Wan, 2005; Luo, 1997). These difficulties could be triggers for perpetuating informal 
institutional relationships between those with legitimate authority and power and those who are 
resource dependent on the former. Such endemic networking could, however, subvert and delay the 
process of institutionalisation and perpetrate cronyism. 
In Russia, the shock therapy ‘destroyed virtually all major state dominated institutions creating 
countless voids in the process’ (Puffer et al., 2016), followed by some mending process instituted by 
the new president in the 2000s. During the early phase of transition, oligarchies were heavily involved 
in politics through which they could leverage key strategic resources (Braguinsky and Myerson, 
2007). While businesses sought preferential treatments in tenders, subsidies, legislation (Shekshnia et 
al., 2014), the politicians used their administrative resource for personal enrichment and a secure 
place within the business society (Gans-Morse, 2013; Ledeneva, 2009). The country is still 
characterized by cronyism and corruption, creating the need for businesses to create networks and 
connections to fill the institutional voids (Ledeneva, 2009). Larger local firms and MNEs entering 
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Russia are constrained by the need to legitimize their operations within this environment (Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2010; Ledeneva, 2012). 
While the literature on transition economies is extensive on the analysis of the transition in the 
1990s and the later years of a more autocratic regime, little has been done to analyze, compare and 
differentiate the two phases of the transition. Further, little research shows how the role of political 
networking evolves through the transition. It is the aim of this paper to compare the two phases of 
transition and demonstrate the significance of political connections within the strategic choices of 
firms in the two phases.  
The investigations into the emergence of Russian MNEs and their expansion also ventures into 
the role of government. While state ownership shows a trend of decline, the largest firms are state-
owned or in close cooperation with the government (Panibratov, 2014). The firms with the highest 
level of government involvement include those in the natural resource, infrastructure, and other heavy 
industry sectors, reason being that heavy industry is the largest contributor to Russia’s budget and the 
most important token of the state’s productive power (Filippov, 2010; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; 
Panibratov, 2014). Russian government realizes the need for innovative development of the country to 
reduce the dependence on oil exports, hence the increasing trend of public-private partnerships in 
various strategic sectors (Vertakova and Plotnikov, 2013). However, the absence of literature on other 
sectors, especially that of the pharmaceutical industry, creates the gap addressed in this paper. 
Research into institutional reforms, both nationally and in the pharmaceutical industry, are therefore 
presented in this study.  
METHODOLOGY 
The literature on institutional transitions and firm strategies of Russian firms is limited and there are 
several reasons why this is the case (Panibratov, 2016; Volchek et al., 2013). These include absence 
of unified data banks due to fast-paced institutional changes, inconsistencies of aggregate data 
between different sources, extreme difficulty in gaining access to organizations among others 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wales et al., 2016). Further, this topic is contentious, and finding respondents 
and data is challenging.  
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An empirical investigation into an innovation dependent pharmaceutical industry was carried out to 
demonstrate the impact of weak government policy, the ‘free-market’ liberalization (1991-1999), 
against the performance of companies in the state-led industrialisation (2000 to date). This study 
uncovers how knowledge intensive firms from transition economies make strategic choices during the 
two distinct phases of transition. The investigation takes the form of a case study approach, 
categorising and understanding the constructs and creating frameworks as opposed to quantitative 
methods that are more suited to testing the phenomena (McClintock et al., 1979; Maxwell, 2004; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). This case study research design was a type of ‘naturalistic inquiry’ in 
which inductive logic was used to obtain insights (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Political events 
and processes are often covert in nature and best analysed through case study research (Frynas et al., 
2006). There is no other way to gain an understanding of these intricate relations other than the 
interviews with senior management of the companies in question. Triangulation of interviews with 
archival sources creates a more in-depth and robust picture of political connections and strategic 
choices of firms. Case study methods allow for exploration, holistic views, most appropriate to 
analysis of real-life examples (Yin, 2009) of the chosen firms.  
To study political connectedness in the Russian setting – strategic firms and industries tend to 
be the choice for academics (Freund and Oliver, 2016; Frynas et al., 2006; Guriev and Rachinsky, 
2005; Melkumov, 2009; Puffer and McCarthy, 2007). The choice of the Russian pharmaceutical 
industry, particularly organisations Pharmstandard, Protek and Biotec as case studies, is driven by 
several factors. First, the pharmaceutical industry is part of the healthcare network, a key strategic 
sector in the Russian economy. The government realises the need to support the domestic 
manufacturing industry to be able to sustain the sovereignty of the country in medicines and boost 
innovation and development. This results in inter-industry diversification into the knowledge-based 
sector, reducing the overreliance on the natural resources sector. Second, although the industry is 
strategic, it is fully privatised, unlike natural resources, manufacturing, agricultural sectors that are 
partially state-owned (Baker & McKenzie– CIS limited, 2016). This creates a spotlight for the 
industry that represents private firms, which are strategic to the state. It is difficult to find a better 
industry to relate business performance and political connections. Third, the pharmaceutical industry 
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is one of the fastest growing industries in the world and in Russia. The industry is innovation and 
technology driven; it can be characterised as fast-paced and responsive to institutional changes. 
Finally, the three chosen firms were idiosyncratic in their rise to top pharmaceutical performers. 
Idiosyncratic development shows there are commonalities in strategic choices, specifically the need to 
maintain connections to the administrative resource.  
Pharmstandard was set up as a manufacturer in 2003 with financial help of the Roman 
Abramovich, one of the then prominent oligarchs. Protek started as a small importer of Hungarian 
goods and finally medicines in 1990 and 1992 respectively. Biotec was established by a politician in 
1991 as a supplier of medicines to the State sector. These differences in the growth of the companies, 
positioning and differing strategies undertaken, provide validity of the findings in proposing the 
necessity of political connectedness in the Russian context.  
Pharmstandard is the leading pharmaceutical producer in Russia, with 6.2 percent share of 
medicines within the domestic market. The 2014 revenue of the company reached approximately $0.7 
billion US with the net profit of 27 percent (Pharmstandard, 2015). The company, as it is known 
today, was established in 2003 when the umbrella corporation of Sibneft’–Millhouse Capital invested 
$55 million US into an acquisition of five Russian plants (Oktyabr’ in Saint-Petersburg, Marbiofarm 
in Yoshkar-Ola, Leksredstva in Kursk, Polifarm in Chelyabinsk and Tomskkhimfarm in Tomsk) and 
96 pharmacies from a failing Russian subsidiary of an American multinational, ICN Pharmaceuticals. 
ICN Pharmaceuticals was one of the first rare investors in the 1990s that could procure and run 
Russian plants. There are nine production subsidiaries of the company, two of which are overseas – 
Pharmstandard-Biolek in Ukraine and Bever Pharmaceuticals PTE Ltd in Singapore. Unlike other 
manufacturers that established new plants in compliance to the international standards, Pharmstandard 
acquired and restructured existing modernized Soviet era plants to become the biggest Russian 
pharmaceutical manufacturer.  
Protek is an Open Joint-Stock Company and a diversified group in all main segments of the 
pharmaceutical industry, including production (Sotex, Protek-SVM, Protein Contour and AnviLab), 
wholesale and retail distribution (CV Protek), IT development and distribution for the pharmaceutical 
industry (Spargo Technologies), customs and storage facilities concentrating on handling 
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pharmaceutical products (Transservice Customs), marketing services (Promofarm) and retail 
pharmaceutical services (Rigla, Bud’ Zdorov and Evroapteka). All the company’s segments 
mentioned above are among the leaders in their respective fields. The annual growth rate is estimated 
to be approximately 10-15 percent, and the market capitalisation of Protek is around $400 million US 
(Bloomberg, 2015).  
Biotec was established as a wholesale supplier of medicines to state facilities in 1991. Since 
then, it has become one the largest vertically integrated pharmaceutical companies in Russia. Its 
success can be attributed to the right alignment of the strategy and capabilities guided by a visionary 
leader in dealing with the dynamic and turbulent changing environment. When the company was 
established, it fulfilled the government demand for medicines through the extensive networks of the 
owner. Through the 2000s, years of comparative stabilization, vertical integration of the company, 
with the government resource, boosted the competitiveness of Biotec. The current requisite of import 
substitution allows the company to maintain its market share and sustains an important link with the 
regulatory apparatus that supports companies such as Biotec.  
The interviews were carried out from 2014 through to 2015; almost all the senior managers, 
nine in total, were involved in taking key strategic decisions over the operations of the respective 
companies and knew the dynamics of creating and utilizing political resources. Annual reports, press 
reports, company and industry websites, industrial analysis and reports, journal articles, and other 
archival data were collected from the beginning of the 1990s to date and thoroughly examined to 
provide a reliable analysis. The breakup of the interviewees is provided in table 1. Excerpts of the 
interviews are provided within the text; the text with no visible citation was obtained through 
interviews. The rest of the information is from a variety of archival research as referenced.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------------------- 
Data analysis included a grounded methodology (Langley, 1999) process to identify 
firms’ strategies during the two phases of transition based on previous literature on strategic 
choices of EM, specifically Russian, firms. Further, an event history dataset (Garud & Rappa 
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1994) was established through the narrative accounts of interviewees, field notes and archival 
documents. This brought forth a vivid picture of ‘what is going on’ in every case (Wolcott 
1994: 16). A continuous movement back and forth between the empirical data and theoretical 
literature on strategic choices was necessary when constructing this taxonomy of strategies 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
This research was challenging for several reasons. A major challenge was with how to deal 
with the Russian tradition of secrecy and low trust of outsiders that make it difficult to gain access to 
reliable firm-specific information and credible official government data (Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). 
The subject of the research being political connections, discussion of sensitive information pertaining 
to strategies of firms, and probing of interviewees on political connections often evoked refusals by 
interviewees to answer questions. Ethics procedures prevented researchers from asking direct 
questions relating to these connections. Instead, interviewers were forced to lead interviewees 
unobtrusively towards the discussion of these subjects. Interviewees were wary of the fact that, if this 
information was to be published and available in the public domain, it would lead the information to 
be shared. Lastly, Russia is a network-oriented society (Aidis et al., 2008; Rose, 2000), so the 
researcher had to depend on personal networks, persistence, and exposure. This is one of the rare case 
study papers that provides first-hand accounts gained through interviews with top management of the 
companies, depicting how such companies adapt to the environment and succeed in transition 
economies. 
Archival research into the Russian context and the pharmaceutical industry with interviews are 
summarized in the following findings and analysis sections. These sections depict strategic choices of 
firms and their connections, comparing the two distinct phases of transition in Russia. Rapid 
liberalization of the country in the 1990s resulted in a major reshuffle of the industry, creating 
closures, changed ownerships, and new enterprises, replacing the old state-run system. Research 
shows most firms in the industry have been established in 2000s or in 1990s, some of which inherited 
Soviet era facilities, while others have built their own. Regardless of the age, they all face the same 
constraints and challenges for innovation and development in the uncertain institutional environment 
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that is Russia. Based on the above, the discussion section draws a framework of the role of political 
networking and summarizes strategic choices in the two phases of transition.  
FINDINGS: INSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVALS & SHIFT TO A LIBERAL MARKET 
ECONOMY, SHOCK THERAPY YEARS 1990-1999 
Structural problems of transformation in the beginning of the 1990s, with severe financial difficulties, 
prevented Russian government and the newly liberalized organizations from supporting scientific and 
innovative investments and strategic directions (Yeltsin, 2000). Missing domestic market institutions 
and profound deficiency in the supply side led to newly opened international borders that facilitated 
trade, foreign investment, and intermediary relations. Newly created businesses that replaced the 
command and control public institutions introduced commercial activities, where profits were 
instantaneous and the demand ever-increasing (Kvintradze, 2010).  
Continuous changes in legislation and excessive taxes along with galloping inflation led new 
businesses to rely on network-based trading. Businesses engaged in various quasi legal practices: grey 
schemes, involving barter transactions, inter-firm loans, avoidance of tax payments, and little 
attention to continuously changing legislation (Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003; Yakovlev, 2001). 
Dishonest civil servants and organized crime syndicates were further impediments to firms (Gans-
Morse, 2013). Johnson et al. (2000) find, in 1995, the size of the Russian and Ukrainian unofficial 
economy was approximately 50 percent; in 1997, as much as 90 percent of managers said it was 
normal for bribes to be paid to government officials, 90 percent of firms admitted firms in their 
industries pay for ‘protection’ to criminal associations, and finally, 29 percent of firms underreported 
sale activities.  
The Russian pharmaceutical industry was no exception, marked by financial constraints, asset 
stripping by management, and the disruption of trade between the ‘bulk substance’ manufacturing 
enterprises in Russia and the finished goods pharmaceuticals companies in the newly detached 
countries (Balashov et al., 2009; Chibilyaev, 2011; Dorofeev, 1995; Sidorov, 2008). Strategic choices 
of firms during the early transition phase (1990-1999) in the following sections are synthesized 




Prospecting involves a focus on leveraging opportunities in a changing and volatile market 
environment. New possibilities thrown up by sudden liberalization require quick adaptation and 
capture of the deregulated markets and activities, such as services and trade. In such an environment, 
firms are headed by younger, more aggressive managers, characteristic of entrepreneurial firms in 
transition economies (Peng, 2001; Peng and Heath, 1996). Firms also orchestrate a flexible 
organizational structure.  
The waning budget support for state run organisations and institutes as well as trade 
possibilities during the shock therapy opened opportunities to establish many new enterprises. 
Leveraging the opportunity, Biotec was established in 1991 by Boris Spiegel, who was deputy 
director of the Russian Research Institute of Agricultural Biotechnology. Seeing the disintegration of 
supply-chains of medicines to government-run hospitals and the military, Mr. Spiegel quickly utilized 
his networks to establish the link between suppliers and the government institutes as an intermediary 
wholesaler in 1991. The first manufacturing investments were made in 1996 to a packaging and 
market distribution of mostly foreign medicines plant, called MFPDK Biotec. Seeing the potential for 
distribution of medicines and the niche to work closer with the government on one side and foreign 
firms looking to expand to untapped Russian markets on the other, the first facility was establishedi.  
The long-standing government connections and rapid disintegration of the value chain created 
gaps for the company to become a successful supplier to government-run hospitals and the military. In 
1995, the chairman of Biotec became a senior advisor to the Social Issues Chairman; further, he 
became a senator for the Penza region. Although he officially left the business to his wife, the senator 
was and still is deeply involved in medicine procurement schemes that benefit the company (Kutuzov, 
2006). Biosintez plant (later procured by Biotec), being one of the rare survivors of the Soviet to 
Russian transition, had gone through major changes from originally being established as a substance 
manufacturer in 1951 to one of the leading ready-to-use (RTU) drug manufacturers. In the 1990s, 
even after losing its main customer base in other CIS states in substance supply, the company tripled 
the portfolio of RTU medicines in five years by satisfying the demand of the population for cheap 
day-to-day generic medicines. The planned economy specified Biosintez remain a substance 
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manufacturer; after the liberalization, the changes in the customer base forced the company to 
diversify into RTU medicines to surviveii.  
Protek understood the demand for foreign products that were unavailable and prohibited during 
the Soviet era. As the country reeled under chronic shortages and undersupply, Protek established 
distribution channels of foreign goods. The owners were quick to realize the acute need for quality 
foreign medications, a strategy that paid off in the company entering the top 20 best performing 
companies in Russia in 1998 and becoming the leading wholesale distributor of medicines. Protek 
became one of the first-movers in distribution of foreign medications reaping the advantages in an 
unregulated market. The company’s inter-organizational networking was purportedly among the main 
competitive advantagesiii. 
The founders of Pharmstandard started as brokers, bidding for companies on behalf of large 
conglomerates or oligarchs. The company could tap into administrative resources and locate the most 
lucrative auctions as these were only open to insiders and people in-the-knowiv. The importance of 
knowing the right people in the local government meant access to auctions and the right to bid for 
vouchers or shares of companies (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; King, 2002). 
Inter-firm networking 
The sudden move to a capitalist economy created new firms with little or no experience in the market-
based economy. Rapid changes and institutional voids in imperfect laws and regulations led to value 
chain disintegration, subsequently hindering business efficiency. Firms formed networks and 
relationships to gain legitimacy in the markets. Much of the economy relied on barter, meaning the 
firms needed to engage in networks more than ever before (Ledeneva, 2009; Michailova and Worm, 
2003).  
Pharmstandard owners took advantage of the unstable environment by leveraging connections 
with power brokers. Some enterprises that managed opportunistically to align their strategies with 
market demand duly backed by owner’s capital became engaged in acquisitions and takeovers. Biotec 
and Protek also prevailed as trustworthy suppliers during difficult times of non-payments, barter 
economy, and missing market-supporting institutions. The other companies naturally had to gain 
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reputation and trust within the high context society where the barter economy was prevalent. Inter-
firm networking remained important for survival (Peng, 2001).  
Key competence focus 
The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the change from a centrally planned economy, where the state 
managed the value chain, to self-managed market capitalism. This meant the customer-supplier link, 
or in other words, the supply chain was broken. Businesses were left to fend for themselves with little 
institutional infrastructure and experience. For many, it was a shock from which they could not 
recover, resulting in mass closures and struggling businesses (Yeltsin, 2000). The rapid changes 
created a hostile environment, where firms were forced to navigate in-between corrupt politicians, 
organized criminal syndicates, and rapidly changing markets. This led to short-termism and distrust; 
firms abstained from long-term growth investments, such as R&D and modernization (Filippov, 2011; 
Puffer and McCarthy, 2011; Radosevic, 2003).  
Protek’s core business in the 1990s remained wholesale distribution of mainly foreign product. 
In the interview, it was clarified the instabilities of the Russian environment prevented the company 
from establishing operations and large investments into production of pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, 
the company became the biggest wholesaler of pharmaceuticals by 1998 and one of the top 20 
performing companies in Russia. Pharmstandard procured troubled pharmaceutical plants for later 
resale or asset stripping. No long-term investments were made due to a hostile and changing business 
environmentv. 
The role of political networking in the 1990s 
In an ideal market economy firms have equal access to product, factor, financial, international markets 
and the government (Knight, 2013). In the years of early formation (transition) when sufficient 
institutions that facilitate market trade are missing or weak (Rutland, 2013), firms and individuals 
form personal connections to make sense of the forming and underdeveloped markets. Although 
product and factor markets are open for the individuals and businesses, personal connections provide 
information and optimal choices in participation within these markets (Goldman, 2004).  
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Financial markets also remain unregulated and the financial institutes are in the early stages of 
formation. Here too, the connections to the administrative resource provide various advantages. 
Businesses and individuals have almost no access to the financial systems due to infancy of the sector 
(Kogut and Spicer, 2002). The connections provide financial institutions’ backing (Guriev and 
Rachinsky, 2005).  
Personal connections also serve as bridges to administrative resource (government) that provide ways 
to work around institutional voids, deal with bureaucracy, circumvent regulations, avoid tax and other 
advantages (Gans-Morse, 2013).  
Similarly, international markets are only available to those with connections and resources. As 
international investors are wary of dealing in a transition economy, collaboration with foreign firms is 
open to the largest and most stable firms (Filippov, 2010). This is coupled with inexperience, 
underdevelopment of international relations and missing or weak institutional formation of these 
relations.  
The weakness and inadequacy of the legal system including judiciary and enforcement requires for 
strong interpersonal links between players to gain legitimacy within the playing field and provide 
some security for these transactions especially in the early stages of relationships (Black and 
Tarassova, 2003).  
In the Russian context, shock therapy years led businesses to navigate through various institutional 
voids. Connections to administrative resource provided legitimacy, security, and sometimes, 
opportunities in new markets. Oligarchs had an immense influence over federal and local 
governments and could create preferential treatments (Black and Tarassova, 2003). Figure 1 
demonstrates the need for businesses to link with the administrative resource in the early years of 
transition when institutional voids are prevalent. The formal and informal institutions that govern the 
behavior of firms are lacking and/or are weak during the early stages of the transition; therefore, firms 
utilize government relations to provide sense-making mechanisms to operate within this environment 
and fill the voids.  
----------------------------------- 




To summarize, the shock therapy phase resulted in most firms scrambling for effective survival 
strategies to weather the turbulent environment. Analysis shows the three strategies illustrated above – 
prospecting in the new forming environment, inter-firm networking, and concentration on key 
competencies. In an environment where rules and regulations change rapidly and policy-makers are 
engaged in self-enrichment, firms are forced to ‘grease’ the wheels of the bureaucracy (Black and 
Tarassova, 2003; May et al., 1998). Lack of transparent regulations in such areas as taxation, health 
and safety, HR and others, hinder business operations, especially in early years of transition (Gans-
Morse, 2013). Knowing the ‘right people’ in the ‘right places’ are the means to circumvent these 
obstacles.  
FINDINGS: STATE-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION, 2000 ONGOING 
The change in government to a more centralized authoritarian system (Buzan and Lawson, 2014) 
coincided with rapid economic recovery of the country, boosted by increasing oil prices. Several 
institutional-building strategies were initiated by the new president to improve the business 
environment within Russia. These included the tax reform, a flat rate of 13 percent personal income 
tax, a substantial reduction of corporate tax from 35 to 24 percent, and ability to choose between 6 
percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits, which made it a comparatively favorable 
tax environment (Mitchell, 2003). To improve the competitiveness of Russian corporations, the 
government introduced large vertically-integrated national champions, including Gazprom, Rosneft, 
United Shipbuilding Corporation, and United Aircraft Corporation among others. These companies 
received large inflows of capital directly from the government to ‘advance the interests of the nation’. 
The government promoted the use of national currency, rather than barter, creating transparency and 
boosting consumer spending. Further, the state established special economic zones (SEZs) to promote 
investment, mainly in inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) that provided tax allowances, 
abolishment of asset and land taxes, and protection against changes in the tax regime and extensive 
government support (Goldman, 2008). Other changes included improvement of the SME environment 
by reducing bureaucratic red tape and a general push towards a stronger legal enforcement system 
(Aslund, 2009). Finally, the centralization of power federally ensured thorough government control of 
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the economy. The institutional voids mentioned during the shock therapy discussion, including the 
barter economy, non-payments, tax evasion, corruption and blat, lack of regional consistencies in laws 
and regulations, and the general industrialization stagnation, were prominent in the nineties (Yeltsin, 
2000). These were alleviated by the strengthening government and reforms. Formal institutions were 
crucial in development of business confidence and consequent aid to Russia’s impressive economic 
growth, see Table 2. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
----------------------------------- 
Strengthening formal institutions meant key strategic industries, including the pharmaceutical 
industry, faced a complete overhaul, especially in the late 2000s (Table 3). Major changes included 
strengthening specifics of operations by introducing “On the circulation of medicines” in 2010, 
replacing an outdated 1998 legislation- “On medicines” (State Duma, 2010). New bodies were 
established including Roszdravnadzor in 2004 that became responsible for licensing and control of 
drugs in the country while Department of State Regulation of Medicines assumed responsibility for 
registration of new medicines. A governmental agency in charge of intellectual property, Rospatent, 
was given clearer responsibilities and powers (Balashov, 2012). The government supplied 3.6 percent 
of GDP to the industry on average from 2011-2014, which amounted to $1.8 billion US annually 
(Peterburgskiy pravovoy portal, 2015). The pharmaceutical industry became tightly regulated and 
standardization of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) became compulsory, in conformance with 
the worldwide standards (Chernysheva, 2014; Meshkovskii, 2015).  
Currently, Russia suffers from the lack of collaboration between academia and the industry 
(Bychkova, Chernysh & Popova, 2015). The government intends to bridge the relationship between 
the academia and pharmaceutical businesses by public-private partnerships, grants, and venture 
capital funding. Creation of demand and supply of new generations of professionals is also on the 
agenda (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 2011). A regulation passed by the Ministry of Health in 
November 2013 makes compulsory for all students of medical and pharmaceutical educational bodies 
to have an internship requirement in organizations involved in medicines, such as hospitals, clinics 
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companies, pharmacies, research institutes, and all other bodies in the field (Pharmacevticheskii 
Vestnik, 2013). As a new entrant to the WTO, Russia is in the beginning of transformation towards 
meeting the international standards of production, control, and distribution, including the TRIPS 
(intellectual property protection) agreement. These and further institutional developments within the 
pharmaceutical industry are provided in Table 3.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
----------------------------------- 
The rapid economic growth spurred by improvements in the institutional environment was a 
catalyst for greater stability and performance of firms. Despite the importance of political networking, 
strategies adopted by firms have undergone changes.  
Acquisitions and political networking  
The Russian financial crisis of 1998 gave domestic manufacturers an edge over imported medicines 
because local manufacturers were able to produce and distribute cheaper non-branded generics 
(Balashov, 2012; Trofimova, 2006). Leveraging factor costs and strong domestic demand, Protek, 
Pharmstandard, and Biotec established their own production bases that guarantee higher profit 
margins, rather than wholesale distribution, which required little specific capabilties. Due to 
weaknesses in their own R&D, companies engaged in extensive acquisitions of Soviet-developed 
formulas and other firms that possessed the rights to these. Indeed, acquisitions is one of the favoured 
methods of expansion and growth for emerging market firms (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Those that 
engaged in aggressive acquisitions in the ex-Soviet bloc became the fastest growing and the largest 
firms (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012). Firms that maintained links to the government gained 
lucrative public procurement contracts and access to various government research institutes with 
Soviet-era technologies and knowledgevi. The cases suggest those engaged in political networking 
have grown rapidly during the Russian transition.  
The key investor of Pharmstandard, Roman Abramovich, being one of influential oligarchs, had 
a connection to the Minister of Health that assisted the company in becoming the leading domestic 
producer of insulin as the government procured Biosulin (Pharmstandard’s insulin) for the Drug 
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Reimbursement Scheme. Enormous capital of the first investors, strong corporate governance, and 
successful IPO in 2007 permitted the company a series of high-stake acquisitions of leading 
pharmaceutical products and innovative domestic enterprises. The IPO owners bought the controlling 
stake from Mr. Abramovich and had acquired their own personal connections with the succeeding 
Minister of Health and related organs, securing the position of the ‘preferential’ manufacturer 
(Kutuzov, 2009). At the time, the company was not interested in its own R&D, as acquisitions of 
other companies and products quickly diversified the portfolio of the company. The promptness of the 
expansion was dictated by the need for strategic players by the government. One of the procured 
drugs, Arbidol, received considerable support from the government officials, particularly from the 
Minister of Health and the Chief Sanitary Doctor. Vladimir Putin, the president, endorsed the product 
by visiting production facilities in Kursk and inquired of the availability of Arbidol in pharmacies on 
national television. 
Biotec aimed at supplying state establishments with medicines. This came from the pre-
established professional links during the Soviet times. The company remained the eighth biggest 
wholesale distributor in Russia until 2005, mostly supplying to the government with little commercial 
presence of its own. Biotec’s direct linkage with the government provided a steady demand and did 
not require marketing or distribution to other businesses. Its main mission was successful participation 
in government tenders heavily influenced by connections within the federal governmentvii. In 2005, 
Biotec’s revenue had risen 75 percent due to a large stake in the DLO procurement scheme, making 
the company the third largest distributor in Russia. At the time of the DLO scheme roll out, the ex-
Commercial Director of Biotec became the head of drugs licensing committee. The Vice President of 
Roszdravnadzor (a body similar to FDA in the US) had been Vice President of Biotec in the past, and 
Boris Spiegel was in charge of the implementation by the Senate of Russian Federation (Kutuzov, 
2006). This allowed the company to procure one of its largest suppliers, Biosintez, and the vitamin 
factory Marbiopharm from Pharmstandard, both in Volga District, for 30 million USD and 20 million 
USD, respectively, in 2005. 
Since the late 2000s, Pharmstandard has been active in investing in further stages of 
development of potential breakthrough medicines, such as a majority contribution into 
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immunotherapies research by US firm Argos Therapeutics. The company acquired the Danish 
innovative firm, Affitech, Ukrainian Biolek in 2011, a Russian innovator – Biocad, and finally, a 
Singaporean substance supplier, Bever pharmaceuticals.  
Internalization and networks 
Although the business environment in Russia improved in the second phase of transition, firms still 
faced various institutional voids pertinent to developing countries. To avoid these voids, firms opted 
to engage in wide-scaled internalization in order to maximize efficiency as firms integrated vertically 
and horizontally (Brown et al., 2008).  
Strengthening institutional environment and rapid economic growth rates provided Protek the 
opportunity to internalize and diversify its wholesale trade business into production, retail, consulting, 
and IT, becoming a large vertically integrated corporation. Since there were enormous institutional 
voids, namely lack of intermediaries, standards, and facilitating agents like pooled labor markets, it 
was necessary to “fill the institutional gaps” through internalization of intermediate markets that 
provided competitiveness in underdeveloped pharmaceutical market. As the prominent stream of drug 
distribution became competitive, the production and the retail sector experienced robust growth. The 
production segment only started to emerge in the 2000s, as there was still an enormous demand for 
high-quality medications that importers and foreign subsidiaries could not provide. Similarly, the 
retail sector was dominated by SMEs that did not have capital resources as large corporations. Protek, 
with its drive for innovation, succeeded in entering these segments and spawning its chain throughout 
Russiaviii. 
To gain maximum returns from the business, Biotec had to have a vertically integrated 
enterprise to distribute its own produce. So, in 2002, the company opened a small facility to produce 
disinfection solutions, Biodez, in the Moscow region. Now, Biotec produces its merchandise through 
Biosintez, Marbiopharm, Biodez and provides packaging, filing, distributing, and other services 
mainly for the foreign enterprises in distribution on Russia. Biotec is one of the main distributors to 
the government and has over 320 pharmacies (Biotec, 2014). 
As the government rolled out the program of additional medicinal supply (DLO) in 2005, 
Protek became the leading supplier of medicines for the program, with 25 percent of the share. 
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Protek’s favored treatment by the government and leading position within the DLO program resulted 
in an unprecedented corruption scandal in which the then CEO of Protek wholesale business segment, 
Vitaly Smerdov, was convicted of bribery of the top officials of the Medical Insurance Federal Fund. 
Another company involved in the scandal was Biotec (Kutuzov, 2010).  
Public-private partnerships 
In any successful market economy, the role of the business in the public sector and vice versa cannot 
be underestimated. In the early Russian transition, large business groups were the exclusive 
contractors to the state. With a consolidated formal institutional environment, smaller firms could tap 
into this lucrative resource. The later years of transition saw the rise of associations and other lobby 
groups, comprising private sector participants, large and small (EBRD, 2009; Hay and Shleifer, 1998; 
Vertakova and Plotnikov, 2013).  
As seen above, networking on political and business levels remained prominent (Filippov, 
2010). It had also become important to acquire and retain assets as formal institutions solidified and 
competition from foreign multinationals increased. This synergy of external and internal resource 
accumulation separated the favorites from the rest. In 2009, the Ministry of Health introduced the 
‘Strategy of pharmaceutical industry development up to 2020’ (Strategy 2020). The strategy is one of 
many introduced by the ministries towards the end of 2000s to develop innovativeness and import 
substitution (Makarkina, 2013). Government support was allocated to pharmaceutical, IT, energy, 
metallurgy, agricultural, defense, and other sectors. This phase can be termed as the beginning of the 
‘guided market’ or ‘state capitalism’ phase (Klochikhin, 2012) in Russia. This phase also marked the 
end of the availability of Soviet off-the-shelf formulae, creating the need for import substitution. In 
this phase, the government began to encourage cluster creation, education and training of specialists, 
private research institutes, and dedicated industrial bodies working closely with pharmaceutical 
companies. The biggest manufacturers had no choice but to invest in collaborations, new ventures, 
acquisition of innovators, and their own R&D investments. In 2011, Pharmstandard became the key 
investor in The International Biotechnology Centre “Generium”, part of the Strategy 2020 
government program to increase market share of domestic drugs, decrease imports, and aims to 
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increase the share of innovative products. The company remains one of the largest exporters with 
most exports to the CIS countriesix.  
Although the interviewees claim the competitiveness of their businesses depends upon 
technological advancement and efficiency in production of world-class medicines, foreign enterprises 
claim it is the government relations that is the most valuable factor in selection of the partners that 
lands lucrative government tenders (Makarkina, Kryazhev & Mikhailova, 2014). In 2014-2015, the 
government provided subsidized interest rates for investments to Generium for the setup of a biotech 
center, also to Biotec, Marbiopharm, Nanolek, Biokad, and Tatkhimpharmpreparaty for their 
undertakings as vertically-integrated import-substituting companies. Government linkages make 
Pharmstandard one of the most valuable partners for foreign multinationals wanting to ‘localize’ their 
production in Russia, giving the capabilities to produce its own high-quality generics, satisfying the 
label of innovation within Russia. Pharmstandard senior executive (Ph3) observed:  
“… Pharma 2020 program and the overall support of the state have had a positive impact on the 
development of the company. In 2012, we established the Department of State Cooperation and 
Procurement… Now the majority of our revenue comes from State Procurement Scheme, making us 
the second biggest supplier...” 
By contrast, Protek operates commercially in b2b wholesaling and retailing, rather than 
government procurement sectors. The company recently invested in the Pharmaceutical Cluster 
Northern, where the company aims to establish its own R&D department. Government support in 
subsidizing development of the Cluster Northern, tax incentives, and preference for locally produced 
medicines were the key drivers for expansion. Protek’s extensive internalization of the company from 
the IT and customs to retail sector in pharmaceuticals helped the company deal with institutional 
voidsx. The government is interested in having efficient national organizations that can sustain the 
industry. The influence of the centralized government over even less dependent firms is omnipresent.  
Biotec’s modernization and low-priced medicines helped the company remain one of the 
leading exporters of the country. As the industry aims for raising the domestic pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacities underlined by the Pharma 2020 program, successful companies such as 
Biotec, are keen to adjust to the new challenges within the institutional framework. Continuous 
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investments in production facilities, resulting in higher output and increased quality of Vital and 
Essential Drugs (VEDs), further highlight links to sustaining legitimacy within the crony capitalism. 
The most prominent production project in collaboration with the government is the investment of over 
$60 million US in partnership with Polish Bioton into a new 5,000 sqm Insulin production plant. This 
will supply 50 percent of injectables and 75 percent of cartridges of the Russian market in the near 
future. A senior manager from a manufacturing subsidiary of Biotec (Bz1) observed:  
“…This would not have been possible without the support of the current government…We are 
providing the means for import substitution of strategically important products and substances.” 
As a cheaper generics manufacturer, the company has been hit hard by the crisis which started 
in 2014, as most substances used to produce drugs are foreign. Biotec is a member of a coalition of 
domestic producers involved in the production of vital and essential drugs. The government provides 
support to the coalition to ensure sovereignty in these products. Both the local and foreign Association 
of International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (AIPM) associations serve as a strong lobby for the 
government. A senior executive of Biotec (Bt1) observed: 
 “… Together with other manufacturers we contacted government officials numerous times in 
regards to revising and raising the prices for the VEDs … As part of coalition of domestic producers 
we cooperate with the government to update its laws on price registrations that will ensure our 
survival and development.” 
Hindered by bureaucratic and inefficient government apparatus, the manufacturers can still 
continuously improve the environment for the industry. This is reminiscent of government-industry 
cooperation witnessed in development of strategic industries in East Asia (Chang, 2002; Kim, 2003; 
Lall, 1994).  
In summary, during the state-led industrialization, companies utilized several strategies. 
Pharmstandard started as an acquirer of key products and companies backed by strong connections 
and the links to the government. When the government realized the need for diversification of the 
economy towards innovation driven industries, Pharmstandard and its affiliated structures became a 
key player embedded within the system in import substitution of medicines. Biotec also expanded 
through acquisitions aided by government programs in an extensive public-private partnership. Protek 
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remained an independent player and diversified its pharmaceutical operations to maintain 
competitiveness within the developing institutional environment.  
The role of political networking in 2000s onwards 
With the formation of institutions (as in Table 2), the need for personal connections to 
administrative resource declined as stability increased and informal practices phased out. At the same 
time, Russia saw powerful lobby groups, such as Association of Russian Pharmaceutical Producers 
(ARFP) and Association of International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (AIPM), cooperate with the 
government to represent pharmaceutical producers in politics. In Figure 2, the strengthened 
institutions that govern the business environment are in place, allowing firms to engage in arms-length 
relationships without the explicit need for government relations. Some larger strategic firms remain 
politically connected (demonstrated by broken lines). Intermediaries in the form of various lobby 
groups maintain public-private cooperation in the interest of the economy and the firms. Transition 
countries are characterized by institutional voids (Puffer et al., 2010); hence, for the foreseeable 
future, the link between the government and businesses will remain, albeit becoming less explicit. The 
salience of connections decreases as institutions governing businesses strengthen, more so as 
collective institutes, such as various lobby groups and associations, become formed.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
----------------------------------- 
A strengthened institutional environment provided businesses with a more transparent 
structured system of rights and responsibilities allowing for a lesser reliance on the administrative 
resource. Firms note that the laws and procedures are much clearer and there is a sense of reliance on 
the system to protect businesses from undue pressures. Further, supporting the argument of a positive 
correlation between tax reforms and regulations (improved institutional environment) as well as closer 
international cooperation leads to more transparent and ethical firm behavior (Braguinsky and 
Mityakov, 2015), this paper finds that firms increasingly rely on the market mechanisms rather than 
personal networks in business operations. Developing countries where market institutions are 
underdeveloped seek greater cooperation between the state and businesses, hence in Russia business 
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associations are prevalent and tend to protect property rights and act as lobby groups for their 
members as the need for personal connections dissipates (Yakovlev et al., 2014). After all, strong 
formal institutions protect property rights, attract investments, encourage business and economic 
growth, and reduce reliance on informal institutions (North, 2016).  
DISCUSSION 
It is shown that state guided consolidation of formal institutions and government support 
result in better business environment and long-term perspectives of emerging market firms 
and key industries.  After the old system was dismantled and poorly funded scientific research 
institutes found themselves in disarray, newly formed market-institutions facilitated the formation of 
intermediaries to fill the gaps. Entrepreneurs used their prospecting skills and political networks to 
gain access to privileged auctions to bid and acquire public firms being privatized and utilize 
connections overseas to fill the gaps within the market. Therefore, the strategies utilized by firms 
included inter-firm networking that included forming bonds with other firms to gain legitimacy and 
trust within an unstable environment and gaining valuable connections with conglomerates. In terms 
of prospecting, entrepreneurial firms with the desire for innovation and change embrace newly 
created opportunities to become first-movers. Incumbents concentrated on short-term exigencies and 
avoidance of long-term investments. Political networking was the key source of legitimacy and 
competitive advantage that created stability and a longer-term vision for firms.  
With relative stability and growth brought by an improving institutional environment in the 
2000s, Russian firms developed long-term strategies. The transformation from basic trade and imports 
to acquisitions and internalization of operations became prevalent. Public-private partnerships 
became crucial in maintaining leadership in lucrative government procurement programs for larger 
firms. Other firms enjoyed relative stability, strengthening of private property rights, and arms-length 
relations. Government relations varied from top-level political endorsements, including President 
Putin’s television appearance for Pharmstandard, to blatant corruption scandals between 
Roszdravnadzor civil servants and Protek, and Biotec in securing lucrative government tenders for 
medicine supply.  
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Through both phases of transition, political connections were a central basis for sustaining 
legitimacy and competitiveness within the rapidly changing environment. During the shock therapy 
years, incumbents exercised caution in investments and sought networks with administrative resource 
or conglomerates with certain influence in the political field. Institutional strengthening in the second 
phase led to more arms-length contracts, better transparency, and more certainty, resulting in long-
term investments. Firms that maintained government links received continuing political support. 
Table 4 summarizes strategic choices during the two phases of transition.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
----------------------------------- 
With an ‘import-substitution’ beginning in the 2010s, the government has been proactive in 
collaboration, support, and public-private partnerships in key industries. The formal institution 
strengthening facilitated more sustainable visions for businesses and resulted in more arms-length 
networking, including international partnerships (Trifilova et al., 2013).  
This research highlights the environment within which companies, both local and foreign, 
operate. Similar trends of government relations and public to private collaboration is evident in other 
key strategic industries, including forestry, light manufacturing, agriculture, IT, automotive industries, 
energy, space, defense, communications, transportation, and nanotechnology (Vertakova and 
Plotnikov, 2013).  
In terms of growth, firms engage in market-seeking foreign investments, such as the case with 
Biotec and Pharmstandard, to countries with cultural affinities, i.e., the CIS countries. This is further 
supported by findings of Kalotay & Sulstarova (2010) that find initial OFDI ventures by Russian 
companies take place in similar cultural institutional environments. As formal institutions improve 
and market matures, companies face the need to innovate to remain competitive and collaborate with 
high-technology foreign enterprises, as the case with Protek and Cipla Holding and Pharmstandard 
with Affitech and Argos Pharmaceuticals.  
Entrepreneurs may work or collaborate with other social actors that help to promote their 
organisation (Bruton et al., 2010; DiMaggio, 1988). Lobby groups, such as industry associations, 
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often fill the remaining institutional voids and effect change in the outcome of institutions. The 
biggest of these is the ARFP, established in 2002, and encapsulates producers with an output of 90 
percent of domestically produced drugs. ARFP represents the interests of the largest Russian 
pharmaceutical producers and promotes the competitiveness of the domestic pharmaceutical industry 
by close cooperation with the Ministry of Health, Roszdravnadzor, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
the State Duma Committee on Health, and actively participates in the Council for Development of the 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Industry (Association of Russian Pharmaceutical Producers, 2016). 
AIPM is another organization that represents foreign manufacturer’s interests in the Russian market.  
The evidence presented demonstrates that badly managed institutional upheavals in transition 
economies create institutional voids filled by informal institutions and networking. The most 
successful firms tend to be ones that could gain regulatory and normative support from connections 
with the administrative resource. The salience of connections was undoubtedly stronger during the 
weaker institutional environment. The firms, nowadays, rely more on traditional advantages in 
remaining competitive. However, the formerly grey political networks have evolved to the new phase 
of public-private partnerships (PPP) (Vertakova and Plotnikov, 2013) as the government pushes for 
creation of national champions that serve the interests of the nation.  
Further increases in PPPs are predicted in the foreseeable future as the government maintains 
its stronghold on the Russian economy and society. Indeed, PPPs are the means to gain large scale 
investments needed to survive in the new order of international trade brought on by WTO and TRIPS. 
This situation is observed in other paternalistic CIS countries, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Georgia, Belarus, and others. This research underpins the necessity of political 
connections not only in Russia or its pharmaceutical industry, but also in other CIS countries (Freund 
and Oliver, 2016). Investors should be mindful that domestic competitors within these countries have 
external resources that often shadow the government’s interests and positions (Melkumov, 2009; 
OECD, 2014). With Russia, MNEs that have entered and are increasingly cooperating with domestic 




CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The study explored the influence of political networking on firm growth in transition economies and 
the strategic choices firms make during periods of institutional upheaval. This research provides 
evidence to support the theory that amid drastic institutional upheavals, firms rely on networking to 
create institutions that facilitate trade and business. The administrative resource of politicians provides 
a significant advantage for EMFs and helps in creation of strategic firms and national champions. 
Research shows – strengthening of formal institutions, such as tax reforms, anti-corruption measures, 
consolidation of law enforcement, and nurturing key domestic industries, results in a more favorable 
business environment, but only partially reduces the need for political networking. Prominent firms 
that are proactive in following the dynamics of the institutional environment, often rely on established 
networks in addition. The reliance on informal networks is part of the culture in transition economies 
and is prevalent at all levels of operation. The ability to build networks and alliances and to legitimate 
new institutions among relevant actors is an important aspect (Lawrence and Phillips, 2004). This 
involves pioneering the building of networks and a set of norms and rules of the game between actors 
in an eco-system. This area is vast and under-researched due to several factors, one of which is the 
lack of transparency, data access and availability in transition economies.  
Although this paper depicted the two-and-a-half-decade transition in Russia, other countries, 
especially those in the CIS, have undergone similar transitions and conditions. The pharmaceutical 
industry in Russia is a key strategic industry. There are similarities of this industry to other strategic 
industries in transition economies. Pharmstandard subsidiary in Ukraine and firms from CIS countries 
suffer from the same constraints imposed by the need to integrate political networking with strategic 
processes. This poses inherent implications to the countries that suffer from such institutional voids. It 
has been shown that politically connected wealth inequality has a significant negative effect on 
economic growth of emerging markets (Bagchi & Svejnar, 2015).   
The government realizes the need for strong formal institutions; these have been developing 
sporadically, creating a lesser reliance on informal institutions. As institutions strengthen, the salience 
of the networks dissipates into more transparent arms-length relationships. Firms are better protected 
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by the rule of law and gain longer-term strategic visions. In Russia, the state is authoritarian, so the 
firms benefitting most remain those with political connections. 
The further Russia integrates into the global economy and aims to diversify its structure from 
natural resource dependency, the higher is the importance of formal institutions. In their race for 
competitiveness, firms must align their strategies to the changing environment. It is imperative to 
channel resources to modernization, efficiency, and innovativeness in the bid to sustain market shares 
in an increasingly globally-integrated economy.  
Policy-makers ought to heed the necessity for a strong regulatory and enforcement environment 
to create greater efficiencies of the economy. The lines between corruption and political networks are 
blurry; it is of interest to the society to facilitate equal opportunities to all in running of business, 
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Table 1. Interviewee participants 
Case study Interviewee In-text referral 
Pharmstandard 
Pharmstandard Senior Manager 1 
Pharmstandard Senior Manager 2 
Pharmstandard Senior Manager 3 








Protek Group Senior Manager 1 
Protek Group Senior Manager 2 





Biotec Group Senior Manager 






















Table 2. Russian institutional voids of 1990s and formal institutional development of 2000s 
Institutional voids of 1990-
1999 
Formal institutions introduced in 2000s 
Barter economy- galloping 
inflation reduces the value of 
money 
Inflation was controlled in 1997 and monetary exchange 
mechanisms eliminated the barter economy. Tax reforms (see 
below), large companies’ control mechanisms and banking 
sector reforms increased capitalization of banks and enforced a 
thorough control and promoted transparency of the financial sector.  
Non-payments due to 
inflation in early 1990s, lack 
of financial institutions and 
lack of bankruptcy and 
insolvency regulations and 
enforcement procedures.  
Introduction and strengthening of laws and regulations on 
business practices, court reforms and updated enforcement 
systems ensured better market-based transactions and elimination 
of non-payments between businesses. Clarity introduced in 
institutions dealing with prosecution, courts and enforcement 
bodies. 
Tax evasion- lack of 
enforcement, raising taxes 
and decreasing public 
expenditure resulted in mass 
tax avoidance 
Massive tax reforms from 2000-2008 included:  
 Enforcement of tax enforcement upon extraction industries 
 SMEs simplification of tax burden- ability to choose between 6 
percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits, 
 a flat rate of 13 percent personal income tax,  
 reduction of corporate tax from 35 to 24 percent,  
These and several other tax changes and enforcement have reduced 
evasion considerably  
Corruption and blat-lack of 
regulations, irrational state 
governance, high income 
inequality, poverty and 
blurred moral norms induce 
this behavior which is 
strengthened in unison with 
other institutional traps  
Ratification of the UN convention against corruption in 2006 made 
corruption a criminal offence. Other legislations including “Control 
over expenditure of the persons holding public office” were signed 
in late 2000s. Anti-corruption Council was set up to report directly 
to the President. Reforms in the civil service department included 
pay rises, introduction of ethical conduct procedures, merit system 
of career development. Loopholes and uncertainties were resolved 
in the Law on Civil Service. Budgetary institutions receive a higher 
inflow of capital in return for higher transparency and checks and 
balances.  
Blat is not as prevalent as in 1990s.  
Stagnation of 
industrialization- the 
abundance of natural 
resources creates a quick 
return from extraction 
industries and stagnation of 
less competitive industries 
creating the resource curse 
Industrialization began in earnest only when the government 
introduced ‘road maps’ for development in late 2000s.  
Autonomous local 
governments- Regional 
centers had own legislation, 
own governance and 
appointment procedures 
Federal reforms- centralization of power federally as opposed to 
regionally; alignment of regional laws and regulations with federal; 
local elections have to have an approval of the President; President 
may interfere and dismiss heads of local governments; a set of 
responsibilities for which local governments are accountable are 





Table 3. Institutional formation in the Russian pharmaceutical industry  
Institutional voids 
of 1990s 
Formal institutional changes starting from 2000 
Unclear legislation 
Legislation introduced in 2010–‘On the circulation of medicines’: 
 Fixed guidelines for registration of new medicines including steps and timeframes 
 Enhanced monitoring and reporting of safety and use of medicines






authorities on all 
levels / Lack of 
knowledge of the 
procedures 
 Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) takes over control of medicines and medical equipment 
including licensing of the manufacturing facilities 
 Creation of Roszdravnadzor in 2004, comparable to FDA in the USA and EMEA in Europe–
aligning and streamlining the system of licensing and control in one institution
 Department of State Regulation of Medicines responsible for registration of new medicines
 Ministry of Health and Social Development (MOH), MIT and Ministry of Justice responsible for 
transfer of practices to GMP standards
 Ethical approvals of the new medicines in oncology, sedative and psychotropic medicines.
Rospatent updated in 2004 ensures protection of the intellectual property 
Lack of specialised 
personnel 
 MOH makes mandatory for all students of medical and pharmaceutical educational bodies to 
undergo compulsory internship in the relevant field 
 Creation of a new disciplines–industrial pharmacy, introductions of post-graduate training 
programs for validation and quality audits. Extensive exchange programs.
No GMP 
standardization 
 MIT as well as the State Institute of Drugs and Good Practices form a team of over 300 
professionals that check for conformance to GMP standards since 2009
Collaboration 
between academia 
and the industry is 
inexistent 
 As part of Pharma 2020, MIT is funding construction of new biomedical centres of the Moscow 
Institute of Physics and Technology Kazan and Ural Federal Universities, Volgograd Medical 
University are constructed, laboratories of the Saint-Petersburg Chemical and Technological 
Academy are reconstructed since 2011
 Abolition of the law that stated any patents developed in collaboration with a government institute 
belonged to the State in 2010
Lack of national 
support programs  
 Additional medicinal supply (DLO) program introduced in 2005; replaced by Regional Medicinal 
Supply worth almost $3 billion and serving over four million patients; other regional programs 
serving almost nine million people in 2011 (Balashov 2012)
 Seven Nosologies program started in 2008–medicines for patients with rare diseases
Lack of 
government 
support for ailing 
industry 
 MIT invested $122 million, 2011–2015
 Introductions of regulations against imported goods such as exclusion from tenders if at least two 
domestically produced alternatives are available in the country; 15% discount compared to existing 
domestic analogues if produced outside Russia; a maximum annual increase of 6% on VEDs 
compared to inflation rate increase for domestic manufacturers 
 Up to 50% reimbursement of clinical trials and/or procurement of capital machinery if new 
development streams are made within the first three years domestically
 Reimbursement of a part of expenditures for setting up production of the full cycle, i.e. from 
substance to the Ready-to-Use (RTU) product. 
 Russian Industry Development Fund–subsidized loans at 5% interest rate, $15 million in 2015.
 As part of the Strategy 2020 the MIT is intendant to support 20 innovative drug and medical 
equipment centres. 
 Cluster creation–favourable conditions including preferential customs and tax regime, allocation of 
land, assistance in training of qualified personnel, among others. Planned government expenditure 
on 13 clusters amounted to $180 million since 2011.
 Government supplied on average of 3.6% of GDP to the industry in the last three to four years, 
which amounts to $1.8 billion annually. 




















Table 4. Strategic choices of firms during the Russian transition 
 





Key competence focus 
Pharmstandard; Protek; Biotec 

























Figure 1. Political connections during shock therapy years of transition phase, 1990 - 1999  
POLITICAL NETWORKING ASSOCIATIONS 








Conventions, norms and self-









                                                          
i Based on transcripts from an interview with Bt1 
ii Based on transcripts from an interview with Bz1 
iii Based on transcripts from an interview with Pr2 
iv Based on transcripts from an interview with Ph3 
v Based on transcripts from an interview with Ph1 
vi Based on transcripts from an interview with Ph1 
vii Based on transcripts from an interview with Bt1 
viii Based on transcripts from an interview with Pr1 
ix Based on transcripts from an interview with Ph4 
x Based on transcripts from an interview with Pr1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
